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EQUILIBRIUM CO-EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRMS AND THE
PLAUSIBILITY OF PRICE COMPETITION
MANIPUSHPAK MITRA, RUPAYAN PAL, ARINDAM PAUL, AND P. M. SHARADA
ABSTRACT. We consider a differentiated product duopoly where a regulated firm competes with a
private firm. The instrument of regulation is the level of privatization. First, the regulator determines
the level of privatization to maximize social welfare. Then both firms endogenously choose the mode
of competition (that is, whether to compete in price or quantity). Finally, the two firms compete in the
market. Under a very general demand specification, we show that when the products are imperfect
substitutes (complements), there is co-existence of private and public (strictly partially privatized)
firms. Moreover, in the second stage, the firms compete in prices.
JEL Classification: D4, L1, L2
Keywords: Partially private firm, price (Bertrand) competition, quantity (Cournot) competition
1. INTRODUCTION
What happens if, instead of two profit maximizing firms, we consider a regulated firm and a
profit maximizing firm in the duoploy market with differentiated product? Singh and Vives [30]
and Cheng [5] considered a two-stage game for a differentiated product duopoly market where
both firms are profit maximizers. In the first stage, the firms credibly announce to play in either
quantity or price strategies. If the goods are substitutes (complements), then it is shown that
quantity or Cournot (price or Bertrand) competition is the SPNE outcome of this two stage game
(see Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5]). In this paper we model the co-existence of a regulated
firm and a profit maximizing firm and, in particular, we model the objective of the regulator and
then (like Singh and Vives [30]) allow the firms to decide on the mode of competition before
competing in the market. In a static scenario this calls for a three stage game which to the best
of our knowledge has not been done in the differentiated product literature.1 Moreover, there are
many papers that provide important results by assuming quadratic utility function or CES utility
function of the representative consumer. We want to come out of this limitation as well and allow
for more general demand specifications to provide our results with the three stage game.
The primary reason for this three-stage game stems from the fact that when the goods are im-
perfect substitutes, it is not always the case that we find profit maximizing firms operating in a
Date: October 3, 2017.
1All the models in the existing literature either endogenize the mode of competition or endogenize the objective of
the non-profit maximizing firm but not both. Hence, we only have two stage (and not three-stage) models in the
existing literature. See the related literature section for details.
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market and competing in quantities (like the results in Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5] sug-
gest). Objective different from profit maximization for imperfect substitutes is a special feature of
many markets in many countries. Examples include the telecom sector, banking industry, airlines,
postal services, health sector, and education sector (see for example Backx, Carney and Gedajlovic
[3], Badertscher, Shroff and White [4], Doganis [11] and La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer
[21]). Even in developed countries we often find the co-existence of welfare maximizing public
firm and profit maximizing private firms.2 Therefore, one cannot deny the role of regulation in
the differentiated products markets.3
Assuming a market where a private firm competes with a public firm, it was shown by Mat-
sumura and Ogawa [24] that, with quadratic utility function of the representative consumer, price
(Bertrand) competition is the SPNE of the two stage game regardless of whether goods are substi-
tutes or complements. Therefore, one cannot unambiguously confirm that quantity competition
will always follow in a differentiated product market when at least one firm is not a profit maxi-
mizer. However, what guarantees the co-existence of public firm and private firm in a differenti-
ated product market? This requires a more careful modeling of the regulatory instrument and it
is also for this reason that our contribution is important.
We first add an earlier (first) stage to the two-stage game of Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng
[5]. In the first stage, a (regulator) government decides how much weight the partially privatized
firm must attach to its own profit and social welfare assuming that the competing firm is a profit
maximizer. We show that in such a set-up, when the goods are substitutes we uniquely end up in
the co-existence of welfare maximizing public firm and profit maximizing private firms, that is, no
privatization Bertrand equilibrium is the SPNE outcome of this game where the government sets
zero (full) weight to profit (social welfare) of the partially privatized firm and both firms compete
in prices (that is, Bertrand competition). When the goods are complements we uniquely end up
in an SPNE outcome which we call strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium where, in
Stage 1, the government adds non-zero weights to both Firm 1’s own profit and social welfare
and, in Stage 2, firms play price strategies.
The first stage regulatory instrument of the government is the weight θ (lying in the closed in-
terval [0, 1]) attached to the profit of the partially privatized firm and the residual weight (1− θ)
attached to the welfare of the society. According to Vives [33], when both firms are profit maxi-
mizers, then, with Cournot competition, there is less of a profit loss with price under-cutting than
with Bertrand competition. However, when we have one partially privatized firm, then there ex-
ists a critical value of weight (θ ∈ (0, 1)) such that for each weight below this critical weight, there
2In case of China after early 1980 we have seen the coexistence of both public and private firms. For example, in the
health sector in urban Chine we find such a co-existence. In case of USA and England, we find such a co-existence in
both health and education sector.
3In case of the aviation sector in India, Air India is a government regulated enterprise competing with other private
enterprise such as Kingfisher Airlines, Spice Jet etc. In the Indian banking sector there are nationalized (regulated)
banks such as State Bank of India that competes with other private banks such as Axis Bank.
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exists a critical price of Firm 2 below which Vives’s [33] argument holds and, more importantly,
above this critical price the reverse argument holds, that is, with Bertrand competition there is
less of a profit loss with price under-cutting than with Cournot competition. It is precisely this
feature that drives our main result when the goods are substitutes.
Our results hold under very general demand specifications. Moreover, our results are true
even when the quantity reaction functions transformed in the price space are non-monotonic. In
particular, for substitute goods, our result hold under the set of assumptions made by Cheng [5]
and with an additional assumption on welfare which is general enough and was used in Ghosh
and Mitra [16]. To prove our results we have at times made use of Cheng’s [5] geometric approach
and, to prove one lemma, we have also used the line integral techniques similar to the one used
in Ghosh and Mitra [15], [16]. Specifically, to find the exact cut-off weight (θ) for the optimal
choice of mode of competition for Firm 2 changes we use line integral techniques and then we
apply Cheng’s [5] geometric approach to sequentially eliminate possibilities other than the price
competition.
The paper is organized as follows. We conclude this section with a brief discussion on the
related literature. In Section 2, we introduce the basic framework, our assumptions with imperfect
substitute goods and we explain the three stage game. In Section 3, we present our main theorem
with imperfect substitutes. In Section 4, we present the result with complement goods. In Section
5, we address the robustness of our game with quadratic utility and we also address the issue
of cost asymmetry. In Section 6 we provide our conclusions followed by an appendix section
(Section 7) where we provide the proofs of all the results.
1.1. Related literature. The classic work by Singh and Vives [30] endogenize price and quantity
strategies with profit maximizing firms in a differentiated product market. This was later gener-
alized by Cheng [5] by providing an elegant geometric approach. There are papers that deal with
Bertrand Cournot comparison with profit maximizing firm in a differentiated products market
with general demand specifications (see for example Cheng [6], Ha¨ckner [18], Okuguchi [28] and
Vives [33], [34]).
In this paper we apply two stages of endogenization. The first stage endogenization is the ob-
jective function of the partially privatized firm and, like Singh and Vives [30] and Cheng [5], the
second stage endogenization is price and quantity strategies. The first stage endogenization of
adding positive weights on welfare in a firm’s objective function seems natural in the context of
partially privatized firms (see, for example, the papers in the mixed-oligopoly literature by An-
derson, De Palma, and Thisse [1], Ghosh and Mitra [15], [16], Matsumura [23] and Matsumura
and Ogawa [24]). This literature focuses on mixed markets where both private and partially pri-
vatized (or public) firms coexist. In the early stages of industrialization of developing economies,
there is often an upper bound on the extent of private ownership. When a foreign firm tries to
enter a domestic market, the government can ask the foreign firm to pursue an objective different
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from profit maximization that includes Corporate Social Responsibility (for example, taking ini-
tiative to assess and take responsibility for the company’s effects on the environment and impact
on social welfare). If we assume that the government cares about social welfare and private firms’
care about profit, then it seems plausible to assume that the partially privatized firm maximize
a weighted combination of profit and welfare. Therefore, objectives different from profit is quite
important and prevalent in the industrial organization literature. A paper with a very general ob-
jective function that allows for altruism and informational asymmetry is by Heifetz, Shannon and
Spiegel [20]. However, Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel [20] do not allow for either privatization
based enodogeneity (like Stage 1 of our three stage game) or price-quantity based endogeneity
(like Stage 2 of our three stage game). Even when we have fully privatized firms, we know from
the managerial-delegation literature that managers maximize a weighted combination of profit
and quantity/revenue/welfare and it is compatible with profit maximization (see Fershtman and
Judd [13], Miller and Pazgal [25], Sklivas [31] and Vickers [32]).
With quadratic utility function there is a growing literature that studies the coexistence of par-
tially privatized firm and a private firm in a differentiated product market. With quadratic utility,
only Stage 1 endogeneity like ours was addressed by Fujiwara [14] and by Ohnishi [26]. In Fuji-
wara [14], it is argued that under Cournot competition it is optimal to choose a positive weight
θ > 0 for the partially privatized firm. In Ohnishi [26], it was argued that under Bertrand com-
petition it is optimal to choose zero weight θ = 0 for the partially privatized firm. Our analysis
shows that, in general, if we also endogenize mode of competition along with θ, then Cournot
competition (Fujiwara’s [14] analysis) is never achieved as an equilibrium outcome. With qua-
dratic utility, only Stage 2 endogeneity like ours was addressed by Matsumura and Ogawa [24]
with an added assumption that one firm is fully public (that is, θ is exogenously fixed at 0). Mat-
sumura and Ogawa [24] argued that Bertrand competition is the SPNE of the two stage game
regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. We show that Bertrand competition
is the SPNE of the three stage game, which allows for endogenous determination of the level of
privatization θ. Moreover, our results hold for a very general demand specification.
De Fraja and Delbono [7] show that, in homogeneous goods Cournot oligopoly with decreas-
ing returns to scale technology, coexistence of a fully public firm with one or more private firms
results in lower social welfare compared to that in oligopoly with only private firms. However,
full privatization of the public firm is not socially desirable either; instead partial privatization
of the public firm is socially optimal (see Matsumura [23]). These results hold true in the case
of differentiated products mixed oligopoly with constant returns to scale technology as well (see
Fuziwara [14]). That is, when firms compete in quantities, it is inefficient to have a fully public
firm in the industry and this inefficiency in mixed oligopoly can be mitigated by partially priva-
tizing the public firm. On the other hand, when firms compete in prices, coexistence of a fully
public firm with one or more private firms is socially desirable and, thus, privatization (partial or
full) of the public firm looses its appeal under price competition (see Anderson, De Palma, and
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Thisse [1]; Sanjo [29]; Ohnishi [26]), unless goods are complements (see Ohnishi [27]). This paper
shows that, the level of privatization of the public firm has important consequences on the nature
of product market competition and when firms can choose the mode of product market competi-
tion, coexistence of a fully public firm with one or more private firms is socially optimal, except
in case of complementary goods. That is, optimality of partial privatization cannot be sustained
when the nature of product market competition is endogenously determined when the goods are
imperfect substitute. We further show (in Section 5) that this result can be valid even when the
public firm is relatively inefficient (but not “too” inefficient) compared to its private counterparts.
2. PRELIMINARIES
We consider an economy with a competitive sector producing the nume´raire good (money) y
and with a imperfectly competitive sector where two firms operate. Each firm produces a differ-
entiated good. For any firm i ∈ {1, 2}, let pi and qi denote Firm i’s price and quantity respectively.
For convenience we define the following notations. Let <+ represent the non-negative orthant of
the real line <. For any x = (x1, x2) ∈ <2+ and any y = (y1, y2) ∈ <2+, x 6= y means either
x1 6= y1 or x2 6= y2, x ≥ y means x1 ≥ y1 and x2 ≥ y2, and, x >> y means x1 > y1 and
x2 > y2. We assume a representative consumer who maximizes U (q, y) := U(q) + y subject to
p1q1 + p2q2 + y ≤ M where q = (q1, q2) ≥ (0, 0), p = (p1, p2) >> (0, 0) and M denotes in-
come of the representative consumer. For any function G : <2+ → <, define for any i ∈ {1, 2},
Gi(x) :=
∂G(x)
∂xi
, Gii(x) :=
∂2G(x)
∂x2i
and for any i, j ∈ {1, 2} such that i 6= j, Gij(x) := ∂
2G(x)
∂xj∂xi
and
Gij(x) = Gji(x). Similarly, for any firm i ∈ {1, 2} and any firm specific function Hi : <2+ → <,
define for any j, k ∈ {1, 2}, Hi,j(x) := ∂Hi(x)∂xj , Hi,jk(x) :=
∂2Hi(x)
∂xj∂xk
.
Assumption 1. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any q >> (0, 0), (i) Ui(q) > 0, (ii) Uii(q) < 0, (iii)
Uij(q) < 0 and (iv) |Uii(q)| > |Uij(q)|.
Given V(q, y) is quasi-linear, there is no income effect and hence the representative consumer’s
optimization is to select q to maximize U(q) − p1q1 − p2q2. Utility maximization yields the in-
verse demand function pi = Ui(q) := F
QQ
i (q) for all q ≥ (0, 0) and for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Us-
ing Assumption 1 it follows that FQQi,i (q) = Uii(q) < 0 and F
QQ
i,j (q) = Uij(q) < 0 for i 6= j.
From Assumption 1(iv) we know that the demand system is invertible. Therefore, given any
price vector p = (p1, p2) >> (0, 0), we get the direct demand function qi = FPPi (p) for each
i ∈ {1, 2}. Let |D| := U11(q)U22(q) − (U12(q))2 > 0. Given Assumption 1, it also follows that
FPPi,i (p) = Ujj(q)/|D| < 0 and FPPi,j (p) = −Uij(q)/|D| > 0 for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. For any
i ∈ {1, 2}, any quantity qi ≥ 0, the level set Qi(qi) = {p | p >> (0, 0), FQQi (p) = qi} generates
iso-quantity curve for Firm i in the price space. Due to Assumption 1, the slope of the iso-quantity
curve at qi = qi is
dpj
dpi
|qi= −FPPi,i (p)/FPPi,j (p) > 0. By Assumption 1, own effect dominates cross ef-
fect implying that Q1 is steeper than Q2 in the price space (see Cheng [5]). We assume symmetric
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total cost of both the firms and it is given by C(y) = cy where c > 0 and y ≥ 0. When both firms
choose quantity as a strategic variable, profit of Firm i is given as piQQi (q) = (F
QQ
i (q)− c)qi for
i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. The profit function of Firm i when both chooses price as a strategic variable
is given by piPPi (p) = (pi − c)FPPi (p) for all i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j.
Assumption 2. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any q >> (0, 0), (i) piQQi,ij (q) < 0 and (ii) piQQi,ii (q) +
|piQQi,ij (q)| < 0.
Assumption 3. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any p >> (0, 0), (i) piPPi,ij (p) > 0 and (ii) piPPi,ii (p) +
|piPPi,ij (p)| < 0.
Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3 are very standard and these are satisfied by
any standard demand function when products are imperfect substitutes (see Cheng [5] and Vives
[34]). Let CS = U − p1q1 − p2q2 denote the consumer surplus and pi = pi1 + pi2 = (p1 − c)q1 +
(p2 − c)q2 denote the aggregate profit with pi1 (pi2) representing profit of Firm 1 (Firm 2). The
(social) welfare is given by W = CS+ pi = U − c(q1 + q2). The welfare function when both firms
choose quantity as a strategic variable is given by WQQ(q) = U(q)− c(q1 + q2) with WQQi (q) =
FQQi (q) − c, WQQii (q) = FQQi,i (q) < 0, and, WQQij (q) = FQQi,j (q) < 0. The welfare function when
both firms choose price as a strategic variable is given by WPP(p) = WQQ(FPP1 (p), F
PP
2 (p)) =
U(FPP1 (p), F
PP
2 (p))− c(FPP1 (p) + FPP2 (p)) with WPPi (p) = (pi − c)FPPi,i (p) + (pj − c)FPPj.i (p).
Assumption 4. For i, j = 1, 2 and (p1, p2) ≥ (c, c), (i) WPPii (p) < 0 and (ii) WPPii (p) +WPPij (p) < 0.
An assumption similar to Assumption 4 was used in Ghosh and Mitra [16]. Assumption 4 (i)
is necessary to satisfy the second order condition of any welfare maximizing firm. We consider
two very standard utility specifications. Suppose that the utility function of the representative
consumer is given by
(1) U(q) = a(q1 + q2)− 12(q
2
1 + q
2
2 + 2γq1q2),
where a (> c) is a preference parameter, γ (−1 < γ < 1) is the product differentiation parame-
ter (see Dixit [8] and Singh and Vives [30]). A positive (negative) value of γ indicates substitute
(complement) goods. We first restrict attention to substitute goods case. One can show that the
quadratic utility function given in (1) satisfies all our assumptions (that is, Assumption 1 to As-
sumption 4) when the goods are substitutes. Suppose that the utility function of the representative
consumer is given by
(2) U(q) = [qs1 + q
s
2]
γ, sγ,γ, s ∈ (−∞, 1),
where σ = 11−s measure the elasticity of substitution (see Dixit and Stiglitz [10] and Vives [34]).
Goods are substitute if γ, s ∈ [0, 1] and complement if γ, s ∈ [−∞, 0]. We first restrict attention to
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substitute goods case. One can show that the CES utility function satisfies the first three assump-
tions (that is, Assumption 1 to Assumption 3). If 1− 2s+ γs2 > 0, then Assumption 4 is satisfied
by the CES utility functions given in (2).
Remark 1. It is important to note that we consider a weaker set assumptions than what is required
for the stability of the equilibrium according to Dixit [9].
2.1. The three stage game. We assume that Firm 1 is partially privatized (maximizing a weighted
sum of welfare and its own profit) and Firm 2 is a private firm (maximizing its own profit). There-
fore, the payoff function of Firm 1 is V1 := θpi1 + (1− θ)W (where θ is the privatization ratio) and
that of Firm 2 is pi2. Specifically, if Firm 1 is a public (private) firm, then θ = 0 (θ = 1) and Firm
1 maximizes social welfare (its own profit). For any given weight θ ∈ (0, 1), Firm 1 maximizes
the weighted sum of its own profit and social welfare. We consider a three stage game Γ and the
stages of the game are as follows.
• Stage1: The government decides the level of privatization (θ ∈ [0, 1]) in order to maximize
social welfare.
• Stage 2: Each firm decides (simultaneously and independently) whether to adopt a price
strategy (call it P) or a quantity strategy (call it Q). See Table 1.
• Stage 3: Firm 1 and Firm 2 compete in the market.
We solve the game using backward induction. Given the first stage choice of θ, let the optimal
price and quantity of Firm i be pXYi (θ) and q
XY
i (θ) assuming Firm 1 adopts strategy X and Firm
2 adopts strategy Y where X,Y ∈ {P,Q}. We denote the consequent profit of Firm i at the opti-
mal choice and contingent on XY by piXYi (θ) = pi
QQ
i (q
XY
1 (θ), q
XY
2 (θ)) = pi
PP
i (p
XY
1 (θ), p
XY
2 (θ)).
Similarly, the consequent welfare at this optimal choice and contingent on XY is WXY(θ) =
WQQ(qXY1 (θ), q
XY
2 (θ)) = W
PP(pXY1 (θ), p
XY
2 (θ)). So the optimal pay-off of Firm 1 and Firm 2
contingent on XY are VXY1 (θ) = θpi
XY
i (θ) + (1− θ)W
XY
(θ) and piXY2 (θ) respectively. With this
specification, in the second stage firms play the following stage game.
TABLE 1. Stage 2 of Γ
Firm 1Firm 2 Price Quantity
Price VPP1 (θ),pi
PP(θ) VPQ1 (θ),pi
PQ
2 (θ)
Quantity VPQ1 (θ),pi
PQ
2 (θ) V
QQ
1 (θ),pi
QQ
2 (θ)
Sub-game perfect equilibrium of Γ: For any X,Y ∈ {P,Q}, any x1 ∈ {p1, q1}, any y2 ∈ {p2, q2},
and, any θXY ∈ [0, 1], a profile of strategies (θXY, (X, xXY1 (θXY)), (Y, yXY2 (θXY))) is a sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of Γ if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every sub-game of Γ.
First, in Stage 3, given θXY and given XY, (xXY1 (θ
XY), yXY2 (θ
XY)) is a Nash equilibrium choice
vector (that is, xXY1 (θ
XY) and yXY2 (θ
XY) are respectively the optimum choice of X by Firm 1 given
yXY2 (θ
XY) and the optimum choice of Y by Firm 2 given xXY1 (θ
XY)). Second, in Stage 2, given θXY,
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X is a best response of Firm 1 against Y of Firm 2 and Y is a best response of Firm 2 against X of
Firm 1. Finally, θXY induces XY in Stage 2 and maximizes WXY(θ) in Stage 1. Moreover, there
does not exist θ that induces a mode of competition Z1Z2 (with Zi ∈ {P,Q} for i = 1, 2) and yields
a higher welfare than WXY(θXY).
We define four possible types of equilibria of Γ.
(i) Let (θPP, (P, pPP1 (θ
PP)), (P, pPP2 (θ
PP))) be a Bertrand equilibrium with equilibrium weight
θPP. If θPP = 0, then we call it the no privatization Bertrand equilibrium. If θPP ∈ (0, 1), then
we call it the strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium.
(ii) Let (θQQ, (Q, qQQ1 (θ
QQ)), (Q, qQQ2 (θ
QQ))) be a Cournot equilibrium with equilibrium weight
θQQ.
(iii) Let (θPQ, (P, pPQ1 (θ
PQ)), (Q, qPQ2 (θ
PQ))) be a Type 1 equilibrium with equilibrium weight
θPQ.
(iv) Let (θQP, (Q, qQP1 (θ
QP)), (P, pQP2 (θ
QP))) be a Type 2 equilibrium with equilibrium weight
θQP.
3. THE MAIN RESULT
Theorem 1. Suppose Assumption 1, Assumption 2, Assumption 3 and Assumption 4 hold. The
strategy combination (θPP = 0, (P, pPP1 (θ
PP)), (P, pPP2 (θ
PP))), that is, no privatization Bertrand
equilibrium, is the unique SPNE outcome of Γ.
Before going to the proof of Theorem 1 we illustrate the relevant reaction functions that will be
helpful for our analysis. If both firms compete in prices, then for any θ ∈ [0, 1], let SVPP1 (θ) =
{p | p >> (0, 0),VPP1,1 (p, θ) = 0} be the reaction function of Firm 1 in the price space. Given,
Assumption 3 and Assumption 4, SVPP1 (θ) is invertible. Hence, we can represent it as p1 =
SVPP1 (p2, θ). In Figure 1, we represent p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 0) by the S
PP
1 S
PP′
1 curve and we represent
p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 1) by the R
PP
1 R
PP′
1 curve and, for any θ ∈ (0, 1), the curve p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ)
must lie between the curves p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 0) and p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1) (since by Assumption 3 and
Assumption 4 one can show that VPP1,11 < 0). The reaction function of Firm 2 is the locus of all
points in the set RPP2 = {p | p >> (0.0),piPP2,2 (p) = 0}. By Assumption 3, we know that RPP2 is a
positively sloped curve with slope less than unity (see Cheng [5]) hence it is invertible. Therefore,
we can represent it as p2 = RPP2 (p1). In Figure 1, we represent p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) by the R
PP
2 R
PP′
2
curve.
Suppose that both firms are competing in quantities. For any θ ∈ [0, 1], the reaction function
of Firm 1 is the locus of all points in the set SVQQ1 (θ) = {q | q >> (0, 0),VQQ1,1 (q, θ) = 0}. By
Assumption 1 and Assumption 3, it is possible to show that VQQ1,11(q, θ) < 0, V
QQ
1,12(q, θ) < 0 and
|VQQ1,11(q, θ)| > |VQQ1,12(q, θ)|. Hence, in the (q1, q2) plane, the SVQQ1 curve is negatively sloped and
its slope is more than unity in absolute sense. Therefore, we can represent it as q1 = SV
QQ
1 (q2, θ).
The reaction function of Firm 2 is locus of all points in the set RQQ2 = {q | q >> (0, 0),piQQ2,2 (q) =
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0}. By Assumption 2 the reaction function RQQ2 (in the (q1, q2) plane) is strictly decreasing with
slope less than unity in absolute sense (see Cheng [5]) and hence is invertible. Therefore, we
can represent it as q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1). The graphs of RQQ2 and SVQQ1 (θ) in price space are respec-
tively P(RQQ2 ) = {p | piQQ2,2 (q) = 0 and qi = FPPi (p) ∀ i = 1, 2} and P(SVQQ(θ)) = {p |
VQQ1,1 (q, θ) = 0 and qi = F
PP
i (p) ∀ i = 1, 2} and their respective equations in implicate form are
FPP1 (p)− SVQQ1 (FPP2 (p), θ) = 0 and FPP2 (p)− RQQ2 (FPP1 (p)) = 0. In Figure 1, the set of points in
P(SVQQ1 (0)) is represented by the line p1 = c. Like Cheng [5], one can show that the set of points
P(RQQ2 ) must lie above the RPP2 RPP
′
2 . One such representation is the r2r
′
2 curve in Figure 1.
o
p1
p2 p1 = p2
p1 = c
p2 = c
RPP2
RPP
′
2
RPP1
RPP
′
1
SPP1
SPP
′
1
SPP2
SPP
′
2
B C
D
r2
B′
r′2
A′
FIGURE 1. The case of imperfect substitutes
Lemma 1. For any weight θ ∈ (0, 1), piPP1,1 (pPP1 (θ), pPP2 (θ)) > 0 and for any Firm i with i ∈ {1, 2},
WPPi (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) < 0.
Lemma 1 states that with price competition and given any θ ∈ (0, 1), at any equilibrium price
vector (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) it is always optimal for Firm 1 to increase (decrease) price given Firm 2’s
price remains at pPP2 (θ) when Firm 1 is a profit (welfare) maximizer.
Lemma 2. For any θ ∈ (0, 1),
(i) ∂q
QQ
1 (θ)
∂θ < 0 and
∂qQQ2 (θ)
∂θ > 0.
(ii) ∂p
QQ
1 (θ)
∂θ > 0, and, for any i = 1, 2,
∂pPPi (θ)
∂θ > 0 and
∂pPQi (θ)
∂θ > 0.
Lemma 2 provides the standard comparative static results.
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Lemma 3.
(i) There exists a unique θ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that piPP2 (θ) R piPQ2 (θ) if and only if θ Q θ1.
(ii) There exist θ3 ∈ (0, 1) such that VPP1 (θ3) = VQP1 (θ3) and, for any θ ∈ (0, θ3), VPP1 (θ) >
VQP1 (θ).
(iii) There exist a unique θ4 ∈ (0, 1) such that piQP2 (θ) R piQQ2 (θ) if and only if θ Q θ4.
Assume that Firm 1 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (i) states that there exist a unique θ1 ∈
(0, 1) for which Firm 2 is indifferent between choosing price strategy and quantity strategy. More-
over, if θ < θ1, then price strategy is optimal for Firm 2, and, if θ > θ1, then quantity strategy is
optimal for Firm 2. Next, assume that Firm 2 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (ii) states that
there exist θ3 ∈ (0, 1) for which Firm 1 is indifferent between choosing price or quantity strategy.
Moreover, if θ < θ3, then Firm 1 chooses price strategy. Lemma 3 (iii) states that when Firm 1
chooses quantity strategy, there exist an unique θ4 ∈ (0, 1) for which Firm 2 is indifferent between
choosing price strategy and quantity strategy. For any θ < θ4, price strategy is optimal and, for
any θ > θ4, quantity strategy is optimal. The cut-off point θ1 (θ4) is associated with the case where
Firm 1 chooses price (quantity) strategy. These cut-off points in Lemma 3 (i) and (iii) reflects
the reversal in the cost of adopting price strategy for Firm 2 compared to quantity strategy. For
the privatization weights below these cut-off points the reverse intuition of Vives [33] holds. To
prove Lemma 3 (i) and Lemma 3 (iii) we use the line integral technique which is the two-variable
asymmetric version of the one used in Ghosh and Mitra [15], [16].
Lemma 4. Under price competition in Stage 2, the resulting welfareWPP(θ) is maximized at θ = 0.
Moreover, at θ = 0, the government can uniquely induce price strategy for both firms.
Lemma 4 indicates that no privatization Bertrand equilibrium is a possible SPNE outcome of
Γ. Specifically, if we can rule out the other modes of competition (that is, if we can rule out both
firms choosing quantity strategy and if we can rule out one firm choosing price strategy and the
other firm choosing quantity strategy), then from Lemma 4 it will follow that the no privatization
Bertrand equilibrium is the unique SPNE outcome of Γ. The remaining lemmas together rule out
other modes of competition and completes the proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that
follows rule out the possibilities of Type 1 and Type 2 equilibria.
Lemma 5. There is no θPQ ∈ [0, 1] such that (θPQ, (P, pPQ1 (θPQ)), (Q, qPQ2 (θPQ))) is an SPNE out-
come of Γ.
Lemma 6. There is no θQP ∈ [0, 1] such that (θQP, (Q, qQP1 (θQP)), (P, pQP2 (θQP))) is an SPNE out-
come of Γ.
Finally, to rule out the possibility of quantity competition, let us first generate the Cournot equi-
librium path in the (p1, p2) space by varying θ from 0 to 1 and plotting the corresponding price vec-
tor. See the path B′A′ in Figure 1 where B′ corresponds to (pQQ1 (0), p
QQ
2 (0)) and A
′ corresponds to
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(pQQ1 (1), p
QQ
2 (1)). The next lemma captures the exact behavior of the Cournot equilibrium path
as we vary θ.
Lemma 7. Let (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) and (p
QQ
1 (θ
′), pQQ2 (θ
′)) be any two points on the Cournot equi-
librium path. If (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) is closer to (p
QQ
1 (1), p
QQ
2 (1)) than (p
QQ
1 (θ
′), pQQ2 (θ
′)) in terms
of arch length of the path, then θ > θ′.
Lemma 7 can be explained in terms of the B′A′ segment of the r2r′2 in Figure 1. For each point
in the segment B′A′, we can associate a (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) vector. Lemma 7 states that as we move
along the B′A′ segment of the r2r′2 curve (starting from B′ and ending at A′), the underlying θ
increases. Finally, to complete the proof of Theorem 1, we need to eliminate the possibility of
quantity competition. Given Lemma 7 identifies the properties of the Cournot equilibrium path
in terms of θ, we can use this path along with the cut-off point θ4 (identified in Lemma 3 (iii)) to
establish the impossibility of quantity competition. Hence, we have Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. There is no θQQ ∈ [0, 1] such that (θQQ, (Q, qQQ1 (θQQ)), (Q, qQQ2 (θQQ))) is an SPNE
outcome of Γ.
4. COMPLEMENTS
To obtain the equilibrium outcome when the goods are complement we use the following as-
sumptions.
Assumption 5. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any q >> (0, 0), (i) Ui(q) > 0, (ii) Uii(q) < 0, (iii)
Uij(q) > 0 and (iv) |Uii(q)| > |Uij(q)|.
Assumption 6. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any q >> (0, 0), (i) piQQi,ij (q) > 0 and (ii) piQQi,ii (q) +
|piQQi,ij (q)| < 0.
Assumption 7. For i, j = 1, 2 (i 6= j) and any p >> (0, 0), (i) piPPi,ij (p) < 0 and (ii) piPPi,ii (p) +
|piPPi,ij (p)| < 0.
Assumption 8. For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j and any p >> (0, 0) such that pi ≤ c ≤ pj, (i) WPPii (p) < 0 and
(ii) WPPii (p)−WPPij (p) < 0.
Assumption 5, Assumption 6 and Assumption 7 are very standard and these are satisfied by
any standard demand function when the goods are complements (see Singh and Vives [30] and
Vives [34]). Assumption 8 (i) is necessary to satisfy the second order condition of any welfare
maximizing firm. With the quadratic (CES) utility function given by condition (1) (condition (2)),
Assumption 5, Assumption 6, Assumption 7 and Assumption 8 are satisfied.
Before going to our result we explain the implications of Assumption 5, Assumption 6, As-
sumption 7 and Assumption 8 in terms of reactions functions in the price plane using Figure 2.
In particular, we are interested in the function p2 = RPP2 (p1), the set P(RQQ2 ) for Firm 2 and, for
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θ ∈ {0, 1}, we are interested in the function p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) and the set P(SVQQ1 (θ)) for Firm 1.
In Figure 2, the curve R2R′2 represents the reaction function of Firm 2 when Firm 1 chooses price
strategy, that is, p2 = RPP2 (p1). By Assumption 7, it is decreasing in p1 with an absolute slope
less than unity. Given Assumption 7 (ii), piPP2,22(p) < 0 implying that in the region above the R2R
′
2
curve piPP2,2 (p) < 0 and in the region below the R2R
′
2 curve we have pi
PP
2,2 (p) < 0. Therefore, given
piPP2,1 (p) = (p2 − c)FPP2,1 (p) < 0, in the region above the R2R′2 curve, the iso-profit curve of Firm 2
is decreasing and in the region below the R2R′2 curve, the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 is increasing.
In each point in the set P(RQQ2 ), Firm 2 maximizes profit piPP2 (p) subject to q1 = FPP1 (p). Hence,
each point in the set P(RQQ2 ) is a point of tangency between the iso-profit curve of Firm 2 and
the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1. By Assumption 5, the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1 is negatively
sloped implying that the tangency of the iso-quantity curve of Firm 1 with the iso-profit curve
of Firm 2 must lie above the R2R′2 curve. Therefore the set of points in P(RQQ2 ) lie above the
R2R′2 curve. Finally, as we move along the R2R′2 curve towards the p2 axis, the profit of the Firm
2 increases since dpi
PP
2 (p1,R
PP
2 (p1))
dp1
=
∂piPP2 (p1,R
PP
2 (p1))
∂p1
< 0. In Figure 2, the R1R′1 curve is the reaction
function of Firm 1, that is, p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 1) for θ = 1. By Assumption 7, it is decreasing and the
slope is greater than unity. One can also show that each point in the set P(SVQQ1 (1)) lies to the
right of the R1R′1 curve. By definition, p1 = c represents the set of points in the set P(SVQQ1 (0)).
In Figure 2, the S1S′1 curve represents the function p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 0) and it satisfies the following
condition.
(3) (p1 − c)FPP1,1 (p) + (p2 − c)FPP2,1 (p) = 0.
By Assumption 5, FPP1,1 (p) < 0, F
PP
2,1 (p) < 0 and |FPP1,1 (p)| > |FPP2,1 (p)| and hence using (3) it follows
that the S1S′1 curve must lie between the p1 = c line and the p1 + p2 = 2c line (see line PP
′ in
Figure 2). Similarly, the S2S′2 curve represents the locus of points satisfying WPP2 (p) = 0 and
this curve lies between the p2 = c and the PP′ lines. In Figure 2, point B is the intersection
point between the R1R′1 curve and the R2R
′
2 curve representing the Bertrand equilibrium point
for θ = 1. Since both firm are facing symmetric demand and identical cost conditions, point B
lies on the p1 = p2 line. Point A is the point of intersection between the S1S′1 curve and the
R2R′2 curve representing the Bertrand equilibrium for θ = 0. Given any θ ∈ [0, 1], the function
p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) lies between the S1S
′
1 curve and the R1R
′
1 curve. Therefore, for any θ, the
equilibrium price vector (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) must belong to the segment AB of the R2R
′
2 curve.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 5, Assumption 6, Assumption 7 and Assumption 8 hold.
There exists θPP ∈ (0, 1) such that the strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium strategy
combination (θPP, (P, pPP1 (θ
PP)), (P, pPP2 (θ
PP))) is the unique SPNE outcome of Γ.
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FIGURE 2. The case of complements
5. ROBUSTNESS
Following Kreps and Scheinkman’s [22] argument on the importance of game form, we first
check how important our three stage game Γ is in driving Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. We do
this robustness check with quadratic utility function given by (1).
(a) Firstly, if we interchange Stage 1 and Stage 2 of Γ, then, in case of imperfect substitutes,
we have no privatization Bertrand equilibrium as the unique SPNE outcome, and, in case
of complements, we have strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium with θPP =
−γ(1+ γ)/(4+ 3γ) ∈ (0, 1) as the unique SPNE outcome.
(b) Keeping everything else unchanged, suppose in Stage 1 of Γ we replace the objective func-
tion of the government by V1 := θpi + (1 − θ)W where θ ∈ [0, 1]. For both imperfect
substitutes and complements, no privatization Bertrand equilibrium is the unique SPNE
outcome.
(c) Suppose, ceteris paribus, in Stage 1 we replace the objective function of the government
by V1 := pi + (1 − θ)CS where θ ∈ [0, 1]. In case of substitute we have strictly partial
privatization Bertrand equilibrium with θPP = γ/(4+ γ− 6γ2− 3γ3) as the unique SPNE
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outcome provided the goods are ‘sufficiently’ differentiated. Specifically, this result holds
for γ ∈ (0, γˆ) where γˆ ≈ 0.8. In case of complements, we have no privatization Bertrand
equilibrium as the unique SPNE outcome and it holds for all γ ∈ (−1, 0).
(d) We check the importance of our symmetric cost assumption. Suppose Ci(q) = ciqi is
the total cost function of Firm i for i = 1, 2 and assume that c1 6= c2. If the differ-
ence in the marginal costs of the two firms is ‘large enough’, then results can change
for imperfect substitutes (see Zanchettin [35]). Keeping the game Γ unchanged, if we
assume cost asymmetry, then, with quadratic utility function given by (1), we have the
following results. In case of imperfect substitutes, if γ(3− γ2)/2 < α1/α2 < 1/γ, then
we have no privatization Bertrand equilibrium as the unique SPNE outcome of Γ where
αi = a− ci > 0 for all i = 1, 2. In case of complements, for any γ ∈ (−1, 0), we have the
strictly partial privatization Bertrand equilibrium as the unique SPNE outcome of Γ with
θPP = −γ(1− γ2)(α2 − γα1)/
[
(4− 3γ2)(α1 − γα2)− γ(α2 − γα1)
] ∈ (0, 1).
Therefore, with differentiated duopoly products, price competition is an inescapable equilibrium
outcome when a regulated partially privatized firm competes with a private firm provided the
cost difference between the two firms is not too much.
(e) Finally, if we have one regulated firm and more than one profit maximizing firms com-
peting in a differentiated product market, then, by taking a general form of the quadratic
utility function given by (1), we can show that in this three stage game it is optimal to
select zero weight on profit of the regulated firm under price competition. However, in
this scenario it was established by Haraguchi and Matsumura [19] that one cannot always
induce price competition. Specifically, Haraguchi and Matsumura [19] show that for any
given number of private firms greater than one, we always have a cut-off value of the sub-
stitution parameter γ below which one can induce price competition but above which one
cannot.
Thus, even in an oligopoly framework, co-existence of a fully public firm and many profit maxi-
mizing firms is a possible equilibrium outcome under symmetric cost conditions and with suffi-
ciently low values of the substitution parameter γ.
6. CONCLUSION
6.1. Government ownership as a policy instrument. Efficiency of a market crucially depends on
the nature of strategic interaction among firms in the market. For example, unless firms are capac-
ity constrained, price competition among firms results in higher social welfare than competition
in terms of quantity. However, it is often difficult for a social planner to find appropriate policy
instrument to influence the nature of firms strategic interaction. Analysis of this paper reveals
that, when firms are free to choose the strategic variableprice contract vis-a´-vis quantity contract,
the equilibrium modes of competition depends on the level of privatization of the public firm.
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It implies that the level of government ownership of one of the firms operating in a market is
an effective policy instrument to influence the nature of strategic interaction among firms in that
market in favor of the social planner.
6.2. Implementation aspect of the policy instrument. One can question the implementability as-
pect of regulating weight on profit of a partially privatized firm. The difficulty of implementabil-
ity is a valid criticism if, as a policy, one has to sustain a weight on profit of the partially privatized
firm which is neither zero nor one (like our SPNE outcome with complements). Specifically if, as
a policy, the regulator has to maintain an exact weight θ ∈ (0, 1) on profit of the partially private
firm, then it is difficult to implement it if the existing weight on profit of the partially private firm
is θ′ 6= θ since the transition to θ calls for redistribution of private and public shares of the firm
which may be difficult and costly. Moreover, there may be other legal difficulties in the form of
upper bounds on private shares. However, by completely disallowing private stakeholders (that
is, by retaining only government shares as a rule) in a partially privatized firm, the regulator can
transform a partially privatized firm to a public firm. In that sense our result on imperfect sub-
stitute that prescribes the co-existence of a purely private firm and a purely public firm is easy
to implement relative to our result on complement goods. However, the need for regulation to
change the mode of competition is absent when the goods are complement.
6.3. Regulating both firms. If the government regulates both the firms in an otherwise three
stage game like ours, then (due to marginal cost pricing) equilibrium social welfare is higher
than that of our SPNE outcomes. Moreover, in that case, the mode of competition is also irrele-
vant. However, in reality we rarely see more than one regulated firm in a differentiated product
duopoly (oligopoly) market. In that sense our approach to regulate only one firm is more realistic.
6.4. On the adverse effect of transforming the objective of a public firm towards more profit
orientation. A public firm may choose to go private either for significant financial gain of the
shareholders and CEOs’ and/or to reduced regulatory requirements in order to focus on long-
term goals. However, in developed countries (like the USA and the UK), the harmful effects of
transition of a public firm towards private firm on the stakeholders was pointed out by Green-
field (see Greenfield [17]).4 It is also argued that a public firm going private may induce more
overall efficiency in the long-run. Specifically, the English government has radically restructured
its school system under an assumption that school autonomy delivers benefits to schools and stu-
dents. However, the paper by Eyles, Machin and McNally [12] shows that there is no evidence of
improvement either in pupil performance or in teaching quality resulting from this conversion.
4According to Greenfield (see Greenfield [17]), “There may be somewhat more freedom for private firms to operate
with a view toward stakeholder interests, but the impact is likely to be marginal. And that freedom could cut the
other way, giving private firms the ability to insulate themselves from stakeholder interests and public oversight,
making them even more profit-oriented and less concerned about the public interest”.
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The harmful short-run effects of more profit orientation in a differentiated product oligopoly mar-
ket was pointed out by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse [1] (when only quantity competition is
admissible and with CES utility function of the representative consumer). Our paper adds to this
harmful effects argument of more profit orientation from the social welfare angle for the differ-
entiated product market under symmetric cost conditions. From a policy perspective, our result
suggests that if for some reason (other than welfare maximization) the regulator wants to change
the orientation of the public firm (in a market with imperfect substitutes) towards more profit (by
allocating non-zero weight on profit of the partially private firm), then we can have two types
of welfare losses. Not only there is a certain welfare loss due to the increase in profit orientation
of the partially private firm, there is a further chance of welfare loss due to a shift in the mode
of competition from price to something else.5 Since our results hold under very general demand
specifications, when the goods are substitutes, the policy prescription is to try not to make a public
firm more profit oriented.
7. APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: We use two steps to prove the result.
Step 1: Given any weight θ ∈ [0, 1] in Stage 1 and given that firms compete in prices in Stage 2, the Stage 3 optimum
choice (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) is unique.
Proof of Step 1: In Stage 3, given p2, Firm 1 chooses p1 to maximizing VPP1 (p, θ) = θ.pi
PP
1 (p) + (1− θ)WPP(p) and,
given p1, Firm 2 chooses p2 to maximize piPP2 (p) = (p2 − c)FPP2 (p). The first order conditions are the following:
(4) VPP1,1 (p, θ) = θF
PP
1 (p) + (p1 − c)FPP1,1 (p) + (1− θ)(p2 − c)FPP2,1 (p) = 0,
and
(5) piPP2,2 (p) = F
PP
2 (p) + (p2 − c)FPP2,2 (p) = 0.
Using Assumption 3 (ii) and Assumption 4 (i) it follows that VPP1,11 < 0 and pi
PP
2,22 < 0. Therefore, second order con-
ditions for maximization are satisfied. Since piPP2,12 > 0, Firm 2’s reaction function is increasing in (p1, p2). Moreover,
|piPP2,22| > |piPP2,12| implies that the slope of the reaction function of the Firm 2 is less than unity. The sign of VPP1,12 can be
anything. If for some (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)), V
PP
1,12 > 0, then by Assumption 4 (ii), the slope of the reaction function of the
Firm 1 must be greater than unity implying that the intersection of this reaction function with Firm 2’s reaction func-
tion is unique since, along the ∂V
PP
1
∂p1
= 0 curve, given any p2 we have only one p1, the locus of the function
∂VPP1
∂p1
= 0
will never intersect Firm 2’s reaction function twice. If for some (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)), V
PP
1,12 = 0, then at that point Firm
1’s reaction function has a slope of ∞. Given that the slope of the reaction function of Firm 2 is increasing (and is less
than unity), we have a unique best response for Firm 1 given any p2 implying uniqueness of the equilibrium point.
Finally, if for some (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)), V
PP
1,12 < 0, then it is obvious that we will have a unique intersection.
Step 2: piPP1,1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) > 0.
Proof of Step 2: At θ = 0, the equilibrium price vector (pPP1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) satisfy following first order conditions
(6) (pPP1 (0)− c)FPP1,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + (pPP2 (0)− c)FPP2,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) = 0,
5For complements, the first type of welfare loss is present but the second type of welfare loss is absent since price
competition is a dominant strategy.
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and
(7) (pPP2 (0)− c)FPP2,2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + FPP2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) = 0.
By definition qPP2 (0) := F
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) > 0 and, by Assumption 1, F
PP
2,2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) < 0. Therefore, from
(7) we have pPP2 (0) > c. Given p
PP
2 (0) > c, and, F
PP
2,1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) > 0 and F
PP
1,1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) < 0 (by Assump-
tion 1), from (6) we get pPP1 (0) > c. By Assumption 1 we also have F
PP
2,1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) = F
PP
1,2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) <
|FPP1,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0))|. Hence, from condition (6) we get pPP2 (0) > pPP1 (0) > c. Using pPP2 (0) > pPP1 (0) > c and using
the fact that the demands are symmetric with own effect dominant cross effect we have,
(8) FPP1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) > F
PP
1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
1 (0)) = F
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
1 (0)) > F
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)).
Finally,
piPP1,1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) = (p
PP
1 (0)− c)FPP1,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + FPP1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0))
= −(pPP2 (0)− c)FPP2,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + FPP1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0))
> (pPP2 (0)− c)FPP2,2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + FPP1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0))
> (pPP2 (0)− c)FPP2,2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) + FPP2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0))
= 0.
Here the first equality is by definition, the second equality is due to (6), the first inequality follows from the fact
−FPP2,1 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) > FPP2,2 (pPP1 (0), pPP2 (0)) and last inequality is due to (8). This proves Step 2.
To complete the proof we also use Figure 3. Given any θ, its (unique) corresponding equilibrium price vector
(pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) is the intersection of the reaction function of Firm 1 p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, θ), and the reaction function of
the Firm 2 p2 = RPP2 (p1). By condition (5), R
PP
2 (c) > c and 0 < dR
PP
2 (p1)/dp1 < 1 implying that p2 = R
PP
2 (p1)
must intersect the p1 = p2 line from above (see Figure 3). Thus, to the left of the p1 = p2 line along Firm 2’s
reaction function p2 = RPP2 (p1) we have p2 > p1. Moreover, by symmetry of the firms, at θ = 1 we have p
PP
1 (1) =
pPP2 (1). Hence, the intersection point of the curve p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) and the line p1 = p2 is also the intersection point
of the curves p2 = RPP2 (p1) and p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1). By Step 2, the intersection point of p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) and p1 =
SVPP1 (p2, 0) must lie to the left of p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1) and, for any θ ∈ (0, 1), p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) is bounded between
p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 0) and p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1) (given Assumption 3 and Assumption 4(i)). As a result, every equilibrium
price vector (pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) must belongs to the segment of p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) that lie between intersection of p1 =
SVPP1 (p2, 0) and p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1), that is, the over braced segment PP
′ in Figure 3.
The PP′ segment in Figure 3 lies to the left of p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 1) implying pi
PP
1,1 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) > 0. Moreover, the
PP′ segment also lies to the right of p1 = SVPP1 (p2, 0) implying W
PP
1 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) < 0. Finally, for p2 > p1 > c,
the PP′ segment in Figure 3 must lie completely above the p1 = p2 line implying W2(pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) < 0.
Proof of Lemma 2: To prove ∂q
QQ
1
∂θ < 0 and
∂qQQ2
∂θ > 0, we differentiate the conditions V
QQ
1,1 (q
QQ
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ), θ) = 0 and
piQQ2,2 (q
QQ
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) = 0 with respect to θ and then solve for
∂qQQ1
∂θ and
∂qQQ2
∂θ . This results in
∂qQQ1
∂θ
= −pi
QQ
2,22(q
QQ(θ))
∂VQQ1,1
∂θ
|AQQ| ,
and
∂qQQ2
∂θ
=
piQQ2,12(q
QQ(θ))
∂VQQ1,1
∂θ
|AQQ| ,
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FIGURE 3. Region of potential Bertrand equilibria
where for any θ ∈ [0, 1], qQQ(θ) := (qQQ1 (θ), qQQ2 (θ)),
∂VQQ1,1
∂θ = pi
QQ
1,1 −WQQ1 = qQQ1 (θ)FQQ1,1 < 0 and |AQQ| =
VQQ1,11pi
QQ
2,22 −VQQ1,12piQQ2,12 > 0. Hence, we have
∂qQQ1
∂θ < 0 and
∂qQQ2
∂θ > 0.
Note that ∂p
QQ
1
∂θ = F
QQ
1,1
∂qQQ1
∂θ + F
QQ
1,2
∂qQQ2
∂θ and that
∂qQQ2
∂θ /
∂qQQ1
∂θ = −piQQ2,12(q)/piQQ2,22(q) = dRQQ2 (q1)/dq1. From As-
sumption 1 and Assumption 2 we have FQQ1,1 + F
QQ
1,2 (dR
QQ
2 (q1)/dq1) < 0. Hence, using the earlier result
∂qQQ1
∂θ < 0, we
get ∂p
QQ
1
∂θ =
(
FQQ1,1 + F
QQ
1,2 (dR
QQ
2 (q1)/dq1)
)
∂qQQ1
∂θ > 0.
For any θ ∈ [0, 1], define pPP(θ) := (pPP1 (θ), pPP2 (θ)). To show
∂pPPi (θ)
∂θ > 0 for i = 1, 2, we first differentiate the
functions VPP1,1 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ), θ) = 0 and pi
PP
2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)) = 0 with respect to θ. This gives
(9) VPP1,11(p
PP(θ))
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
+VPP1,12(p
PP(θ))
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ
= −(piPP1,1 (pPP(θ))−WPP1 (pPP(θ))),
and
(10) piPP2,12(p
PP(θ))
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
+ piPP2,22(p
PP(θ))
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ
= 0.
Solving for ∂p
PP
1 (θ)
∂θ and
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ from (9) and (10) we obtain
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
=
piPP2,22(p)(W
PP
1 (p
PP(θ))− piPP1,1 (pPP(θ)))
|APP| ,
and
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ
=
piPP2,12(p)(pi
PP
1,1 (p
PP(θ))−WPP1 (pPP(θ)))
|APP| .
The term |APP| = VPP1,11(pPP(θ))piPP2,22(pPP(θ))− VPP1,12(pPP(θ))piPP2,12(pPP(θ)) is positive due to Assumption 3 and As-
sumption 4. Given Lemma 1, for every θ ∈ (0, 1), piPP1,1 (pPP1 (θ), pPP2 (θ))−WPP1 (pPP1 (θ), pPP2 (θ)) > 0. Hence, for each
θ ∈ (0, 1), ∂pPP1∂θ > 0 and
∂pPP2
∂θ > 0.
Next, we prove that ∂p
PQ
i
∂θ > 0 for i = 1, 2. Suppose, given any q2, Firm 1 chooses p1 to maximize V
PQ
1 (p1, q2) =
θpiPQ1 (p1, q2) + (1− θ)WPQ(p1, q2) and, given any p1, Firm 2 chooses q2 to maximize piPQ2 (p1, q2) = (FPQ2 (p1, q2)−
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c)q2 where, for i = 1, 2, F
PQ
i (p1, q2) is the demand function of Firm i. The first order condition of Firm 1 is
(11) VPQ1,1 (p1, q2) = θF
PQ
1 (p1, q2) + (p1 − c)FPQ1,1 (p1, q2) = 0.
The first order condition of Firm 2 is
(12) piPQ2,2 (p1, q2) = (F
PQ
2 (p1, q2)− c) + q2FPQ2,2 (p1, q2) = 0.
Observe that the reaction function of Firm 1 is p1 = F
QQ
1 (SV
QQ
1 (q2, θ), q2) and that of Firm 2 is q2 = F
PP
2 (p1, R
PP
2 (p1)).
For any θ ∈ [0, 1], pPQ1 (θ) = FQQ1 (SVQQ1 (qPQ2 (θ), θ), qPQ2 (θ)) and qPQ2 (θ) = FPP2 (pPQ1 (θ), RPP2 (pPQ1 (θ))). Differentiating
pPQ1 (θ) and q
PQ
1 (θ) with respect to θ and then solving for
∂pPQ1
∂θ and
∂qPQ2
∂θ we get,
∂pPQ1
∂θ
=
FQQ1,1 (q)
∂SVQQ1
∂θ
|APQ| ,
and
∂qPQ2
∂θ
=
FQQ1,1 (q)
∂SVQQ1
∂θ
(
FPP2,1 (p) + F
PP
2,2 (p)
dRPP2
dp1
)
|APQ| ,
where |APQ| = 1−
(
FQQ1,1 (q)
dSVQQ1
dq2
+ FQQ1,2 (q)
)(
FPP2,1 (p) + F
PP
2,2 (p)
dRPP2
dp1
)
> 0 and ∂SV
QQ
1
∂θ = −q1FQQ1,1 /VQQ1,11 (q) < 0.6
Hence, given FQQ1,1 (q) < 0, we get
∂pPQ1
∂θ > 0 . Finally,
∂qPQ2
∂θ /
∂pPQ1
∂θ = F
PP
2,1 (p) + F
PP
2,2 (p)(dR
PP
2 /dp1) implies that
∂pPQ2
∂θ
= FPQ2,1 (p1, q2)
∂pPQ1
∂θ
+ FPQ2,2 (p1, q2)
∂qPQ2
∂θ
=
[
FPQ2,1 (p1, q2) + F
PQ
2,2 (p1, q2)
(
FPP2,1 (p) + F
PP
2,2 (p)
dRPP2
dp1
)]
∂pPQ1
∂θ
=
dRPP2
dp1
∂pPQ1
∂θ
> 0.
(13)
Proof of Lemma 3: To prove part (i) and part (iii) of this result we use an application of the Fundamental (Gradient)
Theorem of Line Integrals that states the following: Consider any function f : <2+ → < which is twice differentiable.
For any a = (a1, a2) >> (0, 0), a′ = (a′1, a
′
2) >> (0, 0) and for any scalar t ∈ [0, 1] such that a(t) = (a1(t), a2(t)) =
(ta′1 + (1− t)a1, ta′2 + (1− t)a2) >> (0, 0),
(14) f (a′)− f (a) = (a′1 − a1)
1∫
0
∂ f (a(t))
∂a1(t)
dt+ (a′2 − a2)
1∫
0
∂ f (a(t))
∂a2(t)
dt.
Condition (14) specifies that given any smooth path a(t) connecting points a and a′ in the domain of a function f ,
the line integral through the gradient of the function f equals the difference in its scalar at the endpoints (that is,
f (a′)− f (a)) (see Apostol [2] for a more detailed discussion on line integrals).
Proof of (i): In the price space, given any θ ∈ (0, 1), if Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then Firm 1’s reaction function
is p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ), and, if Firm 2 chooses quantity strategy, then Firm 1’s reaction function is the set of points
P(SVQQ1 (θ)) and can be written in implicit form as FPP1 (p) − SVQQ1 (FPP2 (p), θ) = 0. Given Firm 1 chooses price
strategy, Firm 2’s reaction function is p2 = RPP2 (p1). Fix a θ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider p1(t) = tpPP1 (θ) + (1 − t)pPQ1 (θ)
6Specifically, |APQ| = 1−
(
FQQ1,1 (q)
dSVQQ1
dq2
+ FQQ1,2 (q)
)(
FPP2,1 (p) + F
PP
2,2 (p)
dRPP2
dp1
)
=
U11
(
U22+U11|
dRPP2
dp1
| dSV
QQ
1
dq2
|−U12|
dSVQQ1
dq2
|−U12
RPP2
dp1
)
|D| >
U11U12
(
1− dR
PP
2
dp1
)(
1−| dSV
QQ
1
dq2
|
)
|D| > 0.
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defined for each t ∈ [0, 1]. Applying the condition (14) on the function piPP2,2 (p) with endpoints (pPP1 (θ), pPQ2 (θ)) and
(pPQ1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) we get
piPP2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ))− piPP2,2 (pPQ1 (θ), pPQ2 (θ)) = (pPP1 (θ)− pPQ1 (θ))
∫ 1
0
piPP2,12(p1(t), p
PQ
2 (θ))dt.
The point (pPQ1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) is on p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) implying pi
PP
2,2 (p
PQ
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) = 0. As a result we have
(15) piPP2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) = (p
PP
1 (θ)− pPQ1 (θ))
∫ 1
0
piPP2,12(p1(t), p
PQ
2 (θ))dt.
From Assumption 3 (i) it follows that
∫ 1
0 pi
PP
2,12(p1(t), p
PQ
2 (θ))dt > 0. Therefore, p
PP
1 (θ) R p
PQ
1 (θ) if and only if
piPP2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) R 0. Observe first that
(16) lim
θ→0
piPP2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) = pi
PP
2,2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PQ
2 (0)) > 0.
Condition (16) holds since from the first order condition of profit maximization and welfare maximization we have
c = pPQ1 (0) < p
PP
1 (0) < p
PP
2 (0) and since R
PP
2 is increasing, that is, p
PQ
2 (0) < p
PP
2 (0) therefore (p
PP
1 (0), p
PQ
2 (0)) lie
below the RPP2 hence implies (16). Also observe that
(17) lim
θ→1
piPP2,2 (p
PP
1 (θ), p
PQ
2 (θ)) = pi
PP
2,2 (p
PP
1 (1), p
PQ
2 (1)) < 0.
Condition (17) holds since pPP1 (1) = p
PP
2 (1) < p
PQ
2 (1) implies that the point (p
PP
1 (1), p
PQ
2 (1)) lies above the R
PP
2 .
Conditions (16) and (17) implies that there exist θR,θS with θR ≤ θS such that for any θ ∈ (0, θR) and any θ ∈ (θS, 1)we
have pPP1 (θ) > p
PQ
1 (θ) and p
PP
1 (θ) < p
PQ
1 (θ) respectively. Thus, pi
PP
2,2 (p
PP
1 (θS), p
PP
2 (θS))−piPP2,2 (pPP1 (θR), pPP2 (θR)) = 0
and applying condition (14) to this equality with end points (pPP1 (θS), p
PP
2 (θS)) and (p
PP
1 (θR), p
PP
2 (θR)) we get
(18) (pPP1 (θS)− pPP1 (θR))
∫ 1
0
piPP2,12(p1(t), p2(t))dt+ (p
PP
2 (θS)− pPP2 (θR))
∫ 1
0
piPP2,22(p1(t), p2(t))dt = 0.
By Assumption 3 and Lemma 2 (ii) it follows that for condition (18) to hold we must have pPP1 (θS) > p
PP
2 (θS) >
pPP2 (θR) > p
PP
1 (θR) if θR < θS. But for each θ ∈ [0, 1] we have pPP2 (θ) ≥ pPP1 (θ). Therefore, pPP1 (θS) > pPP2 (θS) is a
contradiction, hence we have θS = θR = θ1. Thus, there exists a unique θ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that pPP1 (θ) R pPQ1 (θ) if and
only if θ Q θ1.
Along Firm 2’s reaction function p2 = RPP2 (p1), pˆi
PP
2 (p1) = pi
PP
2 (p1, R
PP
2 (p1)). Given R
PP
2 (p1) − c > 0 and
FPP2,1 (p1, R
PP
2 (p1)) > 0, dpˆi
PP
2 (p1)/dp1 = pi
PP
1,1 (p1, R
PP
2 (p1)) = (R
PP
2 (p1)− c)FPP2,1 (p1, RPP2 (p1)) > 0. Therefore, along
the reaction function p2 = RPP2 (p1), Firm 2’s profit increases in p1. For any θ ∈ [0, θ1), pPP1 (θ) > pPQ1 (θ) holds. Hence,
piPP2 (θ) = pi
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (θ), R
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (θ))) > pi
PP
2 (p
PQ
1 (θ), R
PP
2 (p
PQ
1 (θ))) = pi
PQ
2 (θ). Thus, if Firm 1 chooses price strategy,
then Firm 2 optimally chooses price strategy. When θ = θ1, if Firm 1 chooses price strategy, pPP1 (θ1) = p
PQ
1 (θ1)
implying piPP2 (θ1) = pi
PQ
2 (θ1) and Firm 2 is indifferent between price and quantity strategies. When θ ∈ (θ1, 1], if
Firm 1 chooses price strategy, then pPP1 (θ) < p
PQ
1 (θ) and by similar reasoning we can show that pi
PP
2 (θ) < pi
PQ
2 (θ) so
that it is always optimal for Firm 2 to choose quantity strategy.
Proof of (ii): Consider the difference VPP1 (θ)− VQP1 (θ) evaluated at θ = 0. It is quite easy to observe that VPP1 (0)−
VQP1 (0) = WPP(pPP1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) −WPP(pQP1 (0), pQP2 (0)) > 0. In particular, whatever be the shape of the locus of
WPP1 (p) = 0, starting from the point (c, c) as we move along that locus by increasing p2, the welfare has to fall
(see Figure 4) and, since the transformed reaction function (piQQ1,1 (q) = 0) of Firm 1 in price space must lie above
p1 = RPP2 (p2), we have p
PP
2 (0) > p
QP
2 (0) and (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) and (p
QP
1 (0), p
QP
2 (0)) lie on the locus of W
PP
1 (p) = 0.
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FIGURE 4. Welfare reaction function in price space
Consider VPP1 (θ)−VQP1 (θ) at θ = 1. We have, VPP1 (1)−VQP1 (1) = piPP1 (pPP1 (1), pPP2 (1))−piQP1 (pQP1 (1), pQP2 (1)) <
0 since for a profit maximizing firm quantity strategy strictly dominates price strategy. Since VPP1 (θ)− VQP1 (θ) is a
continuous function of θ the result follows.
Proof of (iii): For this proof we restrict our attention to the quantity space (q1, q2). Given any θ ∈ (0, 1), if Firm 2
chooses quantity strategy, then Firm 1’s reaction function is q1 = SV
QQ
1 (q2, θ). If Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then
Firm 1’s reaction function is p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ). If we transform p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, θ) to the quantity space, then we can
be write it implicitly as FQQ1 (q)− SVQQ1 (FQQ2 (q), θ) = 0. Given Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy, Firm 2’s reaction
function is q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1).
Fix a θ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider q(t) = tqQP1 (θ) + (1− t)qQQ1 (θ) defined for each t ∈ [0, 1]. Applying the condition (14)
on the function piQQ2,2 (q) with end points (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) and (q
QQ
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) we have
piQQ2,2 (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ))− piQQ2,2 (qQQ1 (θ), qQQ2 (θ)) = (qQP1 (θ)− qQQ1 (θ))
∫ 1
0
piQQ2,12(q1(t), q
QQ
2 (θ))dt.
The point (qQQ1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) is on q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1) implying pi
QQ
2,2 (q
QQ
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) = 0. Hence
(19) piQQ2,2 (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) = (q
QP
1 (θ)− qQQ1 (θ))
∫ 1
0
piQQ2,12(q1(t), q
QQ
2 (θ))dt.
Using Assumption 2 (i) it follows that
∫ 1
0 pi
QQ
2,12(q1(t), q
QQ
2 (θ))dt < 0 and hence we have q
QP
1 (θ) Q q
QQ
1 (θ) if and only
if piQQ2,2 (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) R 0. Let rPP1 (q1) be the transformed price reaction of Firm 1. Given q
QP
2 (1) < q
QQ
2 (1), we
have rPP1 (q
QP
2 (1)) > R
QQ
1 (q
QP
2 (1)) > R
QQ
1 (q
QQ
2 (1)) implying q
QP
1 (1) > q
QQ
1 (1). Hence (q
QP
1 (1), q
QQ
2 (1)) must lie
above the RQQ2 curve. Thus, we have
(20) lim
θ→1
piQQ2,2 (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) = pi
QQ
2,2 (q
QP
1 (1), q
QQ
2 (1)) < 0.
Also observe that
(21) lim
θ→0
piQQ2,2 (q
QP
1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) = pi
QQ
2,2 (q
QP
1 (0), q
QQ
2 (0)) > 0
Condition (21) holds since the price welfare reaction function of the Firm 1 in the quantity space must intersect the
RQQ2 curve to the left of F
QQ
1 (q) = c. Therefore, (q
QP
1 (0), q
QQ
2 (0)) lies below the R
QQ
2 curve. Condition (20) and (21)
implies that there exist θ′R, θ′S with θ
′
R ≤ θ′S such that for all θ ∈ (0, θ′R) and θ ∈ (θ′S, 1) we have qQQ1 (θ) > qQP1 (θ) and
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qQQ1 (θ) < q
QP
1 (θ) respectively. Therefore, pi
QQ
2,2 (q
QQ
1 (θ
′
S), q
QQ
2 (θ
′
S))− piQQ2,2 (qQQ1 (θ′R), qQQ2 (θ′R)) = 0 and applying the
condition (14) to this equality with end points (qQQ1 (θ
′
S), q
QQ
2 (θ
′
S)) and (q
QQ
1 (θ
′
R), q
QQ
2 (θ
′
R)) yields
(22) (qQQ1 (θ
′
S)− qQQ1 (θ′R))
∫ 1
0
piQQ2,12(q1(t), q2(t))dt+ (q
QQ
2 (θ
′
S)− qQQ2 (θ′R))
∫ 1
0
piQQ2,22(q1(t), q2(t))dt = 0.
By Assumption 2 and Lemma 2 (i), it follows that for condition (22) to hold with θ′R < θ′S, we must have q
QQ
1 (θ
′
R) >
qQQ2 (θ
′
S) > q
QQ
2 (θ
′
R) > q
QQ
1 (θ
′
S). But we know that for all θ ∈ [0, 1], qQQ2 (θ) < qQQ1 (θ) and we have a contradiction.
As a result we must have θ′S = θ
′
R = θ4. Thus, there exists a unique θ4 ∈ (0, 1) such that qQP1 (θ) Q qQQ1 (θ) if and only
if θ Q θ4.
Along Firm 2’s reaction function q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1) we have pˆi
QQ
2 (q1) = pi
QQ
2 (q1, R
QQ
2 (q1)). Given that R
QQ
2 (q1) > 0
and FQQ2,1 (q1, R
QQ
2 (q1)) < 0 (by Assumption 1), dpˆi
QQ
2 (q1)/dq1 = pi
QQ
2,1 (q1, R
QQ
2 (q1)) = R
QQ
2 (q1)F
QQ
2,1 (q1, R
QQ
2 (q1)) <
0. Therefore, along q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1), Firm 2’s profit decreases in q1. For any θ ∈ [0, θ4), qQQ1 (θ) > qQP1 (θ) holds. Hence,
we obtain piQQ2 (θ) = pi
QQ
2 (q
QQ
1 (θ), R
QQ
2 (q
QQ
1 (θ))) < pi
QQ
2 (q
QP
1 (θ), R
QQ
2 (p
QP
1 (θ))) = pi
QP
2 (θ). Thus, if Firm 1 chooses
quantity strategy, then Firm 2 optimally chooses price strategy. When θ = θ4, if Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy,
qQQ1 (θ4) = q
QP
1 (θ4) implying pi
QQ
2 (θ4) = pi
QP
2 (θ4) and Firm 2 is indifferent between price and quantity strategies.
When θ ∈ (θ4, 1], if Firm 1 chooses price strategy, then qQQ1 (θ) < qQP1 (θ) and by similar reasoning we can show that
piQQ2 (θ) > pi
QP
2 (θ) so that it is always optimal for Firm 2 to choose quantity strategy.
Proof of Lemma 4: If we assume price competition in Stage 2, then, in Stage 1, the government chooses θ ∈ [0, 1] to
maximize welfare. Given WPP(θ) = WPP(pPP1 (θ), p
PP
2 (θ)), differentiating W
PP
(θ) with respect to θ we get,
(23)
∂WPP(θ)
∂θ
=WPP1 (p
PP(θ))
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
+WPP2 (p
PP(θ))
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ
.
By Lemma 2 (ii), ∂p
PP
i (θ)
∂θ > 0 and, by Lemma 1, W
PP
i < 0. Therefore, from equation (23), we get
∂WPP(θ)
∂θ < 0 for all
θ ∈ (0, 1). Since WPP(θ = 0) >WPP(θ = 1), the optimal choice of θ in Stage 1 under price competition is θ = 0.
If θ = 0 is the optimal choice of Stage 1, then, given θ = 0 < θ1, it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy
when Firm 1 chooses price strategy (Lemma 3 (i)). Moreover, since θ = 0 < θ4, it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose
price strategy even when Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy (Lemma 3 (iii)). Therefore, with θ = 0, choosing price is
the dominant strategy for Firm 2 in Stage 2. Moreover, since θ = 0 < θ3 and since choosing price is the dominant
strategy for Firm 2, it is optimal for Firm 1 to choose price strategy (Lemma 3 (ii)). Hence, given θ = 0, in Stage 2 it
is optimal for both firms to choose price strategy and it is the unique Nash equilibrium of the sub-game of Γ starting
from Stage 2.
Proof of Lemma 5: We prove Lemma 5 using the following figure.
In Figure 5, the curve RPP1 R
PP′
1 represents the function p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 1).
7 By Assumption 3 the curve RPP1 R
PP′
1 is
increasing in the price plane with slope greater than unity and hence must lie to the right of the p1 = c line. Since
SPP1 S
PP′
1 represents the function p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, 0), it must lie between the p1 = c and p1 = p2 lines. Similarly,
RPP2 R
PP′
2 represents the function p2 = R
PP
2 (p1) and, by Assumption 3, it is always increasing in the price plane
with slope less than unity and hence must lie above the p2 = c line. Therefore, the intersection point of RPP1 R
PP′
1
and RPP2 R
PP′
2 is the Bertrand equilibrium point C for θ = 1 and by Assumption 3 this point is unique. Since firms
have identical cost and symmetric demand conditions, point C must lie on the p1 = p2 line. By Assumption 3 and
Assumption 4, the intersection of RPP2 R
PP′
2 and S
PP
1 S
PP′
1 is the Bertrand equilibrium point (B) for θ = 0 and, by Step-2
of the Lemma 1, the point B must lie to the left of point C on RPP2 . We do not impose any restriction on the locus
of P(SVQQ1 (1)) implying that it can take any shape and can intersect the curve RPP2 RPP
′
2 more than ones. But the
7In this Figure 5, we draw all curves as straight line just for simplicity of exposition.
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FIGURE 5. Impossibility of Type I equilibrium
locus of P(SVQQ1 (1)) must lie to the left of the RPP1 RPP
′
1 curve (see Cheng [5]). Hence, any intersection point between
RPP2 R
PP′
2 and the locus of P(SVQQ1 (1)) must lie to the right of point C on the RPP2 RPP
′
2 curve.
The line p1 = c is the locus of P(SVQQ1 (0)). If Firm 1 select price strategy, then Firm 2’s optimal reaction is to react
along the RPP2 R
PP′
2 curve (see Singh and Vives [30]) in the price space. Again, given some θ ∈ [0, 1], if Firm 2 select
quantity strategy, then Firm 1 optimally reacts (in terms of prices) according to the locus of P(SVQQ1 (θ)) in the price
space. Since P(SVQQ1 (θ)) must lie between the line p1 = c and the locus of P(SVQQ1 (1)), for any given θ, when Firm
1 chooses price strategy and Firm 2 chooses quantity strategy, the equilibrium point must lie on the RPP2 R
PP′
2 curve
and it must also lie on or to the right of point A.
By Lemma 3 (i), when Firm 1 chooses price strategy, there exist a θ1 ∈ (0, 1) at which Firm 2 is indifferent between
choosing price strategy and quantity strategy, and, for θ < (>)θ1, it chooses price (quantity) strategy. Hence, at
θ1 the Bertrand equilibrium price vector (pPP1 (θ1), p
PP
2 (θ1)) and Type-1 equilibrium price vector (p
PQ
1 (θ1), p
PQ
2 (θ1)
induces same profit for Firm 2. The point (pPP1 (θ1), p
PP
2 (θ1)) is the intersection point of R
PP
2 R
PP′
2 and the locus of
p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ1) and the point (p
PQ
1 (θ1), p
PQ
2 (θ1)) is intersection point of R
PP
2 R
PP′
2 and locus of P(SVQQ1 (θ1)) in
the price space. Since along the RPP2 R
PP′
2 curve, any two distinct points generate distinct profits, we must have
pPPi (θ1) = p
PQ
i (θ1). Hence, at (p
PP
1 (θ1), p
PP
2 (θ1)), the locus of p1 = SV
PP
1 (p2, θ1) and the locus of P(SVQQ1 (θ1))
intersect on the RPP2 R
PP′
2 curve in the price space and the intersection point is unique by Lemma 3 (i). Since the locus
of p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ1) must lie between S
PP
1 S
PP′
1 and R
PP
1 R
PP′
1 and since θ1 ∈ (0, 1), the point (pPP1 (θ1), pPP2 (θ1)) must
lie at the interior on the segment BC of the RPP2 curve. Without loss of generality, let E be that point. By Lemma 2 (ii)
∂pPQi
∂θ > 0, any point on the segment AE excepting point E corresponds to θ < θ1. Hence, we cannot find any selection
θ in Stage 1 for the government that can induce any (p1, p2) combination that lie in this segment of AE (except point
E). Finally, the government won’t induce any point on or to the right of E since each such point (on the RPP2 R
PP′
2 )
generates less welfare than at point B. Since the point B can be induced by choosing θ = 0 (by Lemma 4), the result
follows.
Proof of Lemma 6: Consider Figure 6. In Figure 6 we introduce two new curves. The first one is the iso-welfare curve
corresponding to welfare level of point B (that is, the welfare level WPP(0)). The second one is the SPP2 S
PP′
2 curve
which is the locus of WPP2 (p) = 0. Point B is Bertrand equilibrium for θ = 0 and, by Lemma 4, this point can be
uniquely induced by choosing θ = 0. If the resulting welfare from any strategy associated with Type II equilibrium
24 MANIPUSHPAK MITRA, RUPAYAN PAL, ARINDAM PAUL, AND P. M. SHARADA
o
p1
p2 p1 = p2
p1 = c
p2 = c
RPP2
RPP
′
2
RPP1
RPP
′
1
SPP1
SPP
′
1
SPP2
SPP
′
2
A
B C
D
WPP(0)
FIGURE 6. Impossibility of Type II equilibrium
yields a welfare less than the welfare level corresponding to point B, then the possibility of Type II equilibrium is
ruled out. By Assumption 4 (i), in the regions above and below both SPP1 S
PP′
1 and S
PP
2 S
PP′
2 curves, the iso-welfare
curve is upward sloping and in the region lying between these curves, the iso-welfare curve is downward sloping.
The Bertrand equilibrium point at θ = 0 (that is, point B) lies on the SPP1 S
PP′
1 curve and is located above the S
PP
2 S
PP′
2
curve. Therefore, to the left of point B the iso-welfare curve is increasing and to the right of point B it is decreasing.
Since a consequence of welfare maximization in terms of quantity choice yields (p1 = c, p2 = c) as the resulting
price vector, it is the global maximum of WPP(p). Therefore, the upper contour set ΩPPW = {p | WPP(p) ≥ W
PP
(0)}
of B is the region shaded in gray in Figure 6 that always includes point (c, c) as an interior point. When Firm 1
chooses quantity strategy and Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then the reaction function of Firm 1 is the locus of
p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) lying between the R
PP
1 R
PP′
1 and the S
PP
1 S
PP′
1 curves. The reaction function of Firm 2 is the locus
of the set P(RPP2 ) that lies completely above the RPP2 RPP
′
2 . Therefore, any potential Type II equilibrium point must
belong to the region lying between the RPP1 R
PP′
1 curve and the S
PP
1 S
PP′
1 curve and must also lie above the R
PP
2 R
PP′
2
as shown in the Figure 6 by the dotted region (where the boundary is not included for the BC segment). Hence,
the set in which the Type II equilibrium can occur is EQP = {p | piPP2,2 (p) > 0,WPP1 (p).piPP1,1 (p) ≤ 0}. Since, due
to Assumption 4, the SPP1 S
PP′
1 curve can never bend back and since the only intersection of the closure of E
QP and
the ΩPPW is point B and B is not in E
QP, the set ΩPPW and the set E
QP must be disjoint. Hence, for any price vector
associated with Type II equilibrium, the resulting welfare is always less than the welfare corresponding to point B.
Therefore, Type II equilibrium is ruled out.
Proof of Lemma 7: Consider Figure 9 where in Figure 7 we consider the quantity space and in Figure 8 we consider
the price space. In Figure 7, the curves R1R′1, RC and R2R
′
2 corresponds respectively to the function q1 = SV
QQ
1 (q2, 1),
q1 = SV
QQ
1 (q2, 0) and q2 = R
QQ
2 (q1). Each curve is negatively sloped and both R1R
′
1 and R1C curves have an
absolute slope of more than unity and the R2R′2 curve has an absolute slope of less than unity. If θ = 1, then firms
are symmetric and hence we have qQQ1 (1) = q
QQ
2 (1). Hence, the intersection point of R1R
′
1 and R2R
′
2 must lie on
the q1 = q2 line (see point A in Figure 7). For any point on the R1C curve we have p1 = c and for any point on
the R1R′1 curve we have p1 > c excepting at point R1 where we have q1 = 0 and hence we also have p1 = c. Since
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by Assumption 1 own effect on indirect demand is negative, the R1C curve must lie to the right of the R1R′1 curve .
Consider point B (in Figure 7) which is the point of intersection between the R1C and the R2R′2 curves. Point B must
lie to the right of point A and both A and B are on R2R′2. Point B is the Cournot equilibrium vector (q
QQ
1 (0), q
QQ
2 (0)).
Firstly, by Lemma 2, ∂q
QQ
1
∂θ < 0 and
∂qQQ2
∂θ > 0. Secondly, one can show that
∂qQQ2
∂θ =
dRQQ2
dq1
∂qQQ1
∂θ (see the proof of Lemma
2 (i)). Thirdly, for any θ ∈ [0, 1], the equilibrium point (qQQ1 (θ), qQQ2 (θ)) must lie on the R2R′2 curve. Hence, for
all θ ∈ [0, 1], (q1 = qQQ1 (θ), q2 = qQQ2 (θ)) is the parametric representation of the AB segment of R2R′2 with A (B)
representing the quantity vector corresponding to θ = 1 (θ = 0). As θ varies from 0 to 1 we move from point B to
point A along R2R′2 as shown by the arrows in Figure 7.
.4
o
q1
q2 q1 = q2
R1
R′1
R2
R′2C
A
B
FIGURE 7. Quantity Space
.4 o
p1
p2 p1 = p2
p1 = c
p2 = c
r2
B′
r′2A
′
FIGURE 8. The Price Space
FIGURE 9. Quantity reaction function in the quantity and price space
Consider Figure 8 and let the curve r2r′2 represent the set P(RQQ2 ). Point A′ and B′ in Figure 8 correspond to the
points A and B respectively of Figure 7. Since for any Cournot equilibrium the resulting price vector must satisfy
p2 ≥ p1 ≥ c, the segment B′A′ must lie between the p1 = c line and the p1 = p2 line and above the RPP2 RPP
′
2 curve
(see Cheng [5]). By Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the Cournot equilibrium quantity vector (qQQ1 (θ), q
QQ
2 (θ)) is
unique for each θ implying that (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) is also unique. Therefore, for the segment B
′A′, given any p1 we
must get a single p2 and this segment can be represented as a function p2 = r
QQ
2 (p1) defined for p1 ∈ [c, pQQ1 (1)]. For
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each p1, r
QQ
2 (p1) is always well-defined and given continuity of AB segment, the B
′A′ segment is also continuous.
Starting from B′ if we move towards A′ along the segment B′A′, the underlying θ increases since the B′A′ segment
has a functional representation it cannot be backward bending. Hence, given ∂p
QQ
1
∂θ > 0, p
QQ
1 (θ) increases along the
segment B′A′ when we start from B′.
Proof of Lemma 8: Consider Figure 10. Given any θ ∈ [0, 1], if qQQ(θ) is Cournot equilibrium quantity vector, then
qQQ2 (θ) = R
QQ
2 (q
QQ
1 (θ)) and q
QQ
1 (θ) = SV
QQ
1 (q
QQ
2 (θ), θ) and the resulting price of Firm i is p
QQ
i (θ) = F
QQ
i (q
QQ(θ))
implying that the price vector (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) ∈ P(RQQ2 ) ∩ P(SVQQ1 (θ)). The graph P(RQQ2 ) must lie above
RPP2 in the price space and P(SVQQ1 (θ)) is bounded between p1 = c and the graph P(SVQQ1 (1)). Again, since
the firms face identical demand and cost conditions, the Cournot equilibrium price vector must lie in EQQ = {p |
piPP1,1 (p) > 0, p1 > c and p2 ≥ p1}. Therefore, the region A in Figure 10 represents the set EQQ ∩ΩPPW . This region
A represents the set of points where Cournot equilibrium can occur and resulting welfare is higher compared to
point B. If P(RQQ2 ) ∩ΩPPW = ∅, then, in Stage 1, the government’s optimal choice of θ can never induce Cournot
competition since, by choosing θ = 0, the government can improve the level of welfare.
o
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p2 p1 = p2
p1 = c
p2 = c
RPP2
RPP
′
2
RPP1
RPP
′
1
SPP1
SPP
′
1
SPP2
SPP
′
2
A
B
pPP1 (0)
C
D
WPP(0)
A
FIGURE 10. Case 1
If P(RQQ2 ) ∩ΩPPW 6= ∅, then can the government induce quantity competition by choosing θ in such a way that
the resulting price vector (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) ∈ EQQ ∩ΩPPW ? Consider the sets EQQ≥ = {p | p ∈ EQQ and p1 ≥ pPP1 (0)}
and EQQ< = {p | p ∈ EQQ and p1 < pPP1 (0)}. Observe that EQQ≥ ∩ EQQ< = ∅ and EQQ≥ ∪ EQQ< = EQQ. We consider two
exhaustive cases.
Case 1: EQP ∩ EQQ< = ∅.
Case 2: EQP ∩ EQQ< 6= ∅
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For Case 1, EQP lies to the right of the vertical line p1 = pPP1 (0) (see Figure 10). Since E
QP ⊂ EQQ, we must have
EQP ⊂ EQQ≥ . Given EQP ∩ P(RQQ2 ) 6= ∅, EQP ∩ΩPPW = ∅ (by Lemma 6) and the continuity of the graph of P(RQQ2 )
in the price plane, there exists exactly one compact set SP(⊂ P(RQQ2 )) such that (a) the interior of SP is contained
in the complement set of EQP ∩ΩPPW , (b) we can find (p1, p2) in the intersection of the boundaries of the sets SP and
ΩPPW , and, (c) we can find another (p1, p2) in the intersection of the boundaries of the sets SP and E
QP. Using Lemma
7 we can now say that each θ for which (pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) in the interior of SP is higher compared to every θ such that
(pQQ1 (θ), p
QQ
2 (θ)) ∈ ΩPPW ∩P(RQQ2 ) and is lower compared to every θ such that (pQQ1 (θ), pQQ2 (θ)) ∈ EQP ∩P(RQQ2 ).
By Lemma 3 (iii), (pPP1 (θ4), p
PP
2 (θ4)) ∈ EQP. Hence, for every θ such that (pQQ1 (θ), pQQ2 (θ)) ∈ ΩPPW ∩P(RQQ2 ), θ < θ4.
Thus, it is impossible for the government to induce Cournot competition by choosing θ such that resulting price
vector belongs to ΩPPW ∩ P(RQQ2 ).
For Case 2, the entire EQP does not lie to the right of the vertical line p1 = pPP1 (0) (see Figure 11). Consider the
set EQP< = {(p1, p2) | (p1, p2) ∈ EQP, p1 < pPP1 (0)}. If EQP< ∩ P(RQQ2 ) = ∅, then the analysis is similar to Case
1 and Cournot competition cannot be sustained. Finally, if EQP< ∩ P(RQQ2 ) 6= ∅, then given P(RQQ2 ) ∩ΩPPW 6= ∅,
ΩPPW ∩ EQP = ∅ and continuity of the graph of P(RQQ2 ) in the price plane, we can find at least one SP ⊂ P(RQQ2 )
for which we have three mutually exclusive sets SPa, SPb and SPc such that SPa ∪ SPb ∪ SPc = SP, SPa ⊂ EQP,
SPb ⊂ <2++ \ {ΩPPW ∪ EQP} and SPc ⊂ ΩPPW . Assume that there are M such SPs’. Denote a representative SP as SPm
where m ∈ {1, 2, ...., M}. Therefore, for each SPm we have a set SP′m ⊂ EQP. Can we find (pQQ1 (θ4), pQQ2 (θ4)) ∈ SPam ?
The following argument shows that the answer is no. By Lemma 7, along the graph of the set SPam in the price plane,
p1 is increasing (along the segment B′A′ in Figure 8) and it must contain at least two points in the boundary of EQP
each of which corresponds to Type I equilibrium price vector for θ = 0. Along the graph SPam , the behavior of p
QP
1 (θ)
is shown in Figure 12. Suppose (pQQ1 (θ4), p
QQ
2 (θ4)) ∈ SPam . By Lemma 3 (ii) θ4 is unique and by Lemma 2, pQQ1 (θ)
is increasing in θ. Therefore (pQQ1 (θ4), p
QQ
2 (θ4)) is unique. Hence, if (p
QQ
1 (θ4), p
QQ
2 (θ4)) ∈ SPam , then there dose not
exist any k ∈ {1, 2, ...., M} with k 6= m such that (pQQ1 (θ4), pQQ2 (θ4)) ∈ SPak .
Let OT denote the length of the OT segment in Figure 12. Given (pQQ1 (θ4), p
QQ
2 (θ4)) ∈ SPam , θ4 > OT is not
possible. If θ4 = OT, then for p
QQ
1 (θ) = p
QP
1 (θ) at θ = θ4 either p
QQ
1 (θ) has slope of ∞ at θ4 (which is impossible
since VQQ1,11pi
QQ
2,22 − VQQ1,12piQQ2,12 6= 0) or pQQ1 (θ) should intersect pQP1 (θ) twice which is again a contradiction due to
uniqueness of θ4 (see Lemma 3 (iii)). If θ4 < OT, then (given p
QQ
1 (θ) = p
QP
1 (θ) holds for at most one θ) the only
possibility is that pQQ1 (θ) is tangent to the lower segment of p
QP
1 (θ) at θ = θ4 which is again a contradiction since, in
that case, we can find at least one θ > θ4 such that p
QP
1 (θ) > p
QQ
1 (θ).
Proof of Proposition 1: We use four steps to prove the result.
Step (i): The value of θ that maximizes WPP(θ) must belongs to (0, 1).
Proof of Step (i): The first order condition of Stage 1 under the assumption that firms select price strategy in Stage 2 is
given by
(24)
∂WPP
∂θ
=WPP1 (p
PP(θ))
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
+WPP2 (p
PP(θ))
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ
.
Like Lemma 2, when goods are complement one can show that ∂p
PP
1 (θ)
∂θ > 0,
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ < 0, and,
∂pPP2 (θ)
∂θ =
dRPP2 (p1)
dp1
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ .
Therefore, from condition (24) we get,
(25)
∂WPP
∂θ
=
(
WPP1 (p
PP(θ)) +
dRPP2
dp1
WPP2 (p
PP(θ))
)
∂pPP1 (θ)
∂θ
.
At θ = 0, the price vector (pPP1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) corresponds to point A in the Figure 2. At A W
PP
1 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) = 0
(since, point A must lie on the S1S′1 curve), W
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (0), p
PP
2 (0)) < 0 (since, point A must lie above PP
′) and, by
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Assumption 7, we also have (dRPP2 (p1)/dp1) < 0. Hence, at θ = 0,
∂WPP
∂θ =
dWPP
dθ > 0. At θ = 1, the price vector
(pPP1 (1), p
PP
2 (1)) corresponds to point B in the Figure 2 where we have W
PP
1 (p
PP
1 (1), p
PP
2 (1)) < 0 (since point B
must lie to the right of S1S′1), W
PP
2 (p
PP
1 (1), p
PP
2 (1)) < 0 (since point B must lie above S2S
′
2), W
PP
1 (p
PP
1 (1), p
PP
2 (1)) =
WPP2 (p
PP
1 (1), p
PP
2 (1)) (since point B must lie on p1 = p2 line and the welfare function is symmetric) and (applying
Assumption 7) we also have −1 < (dRPP2 (p1)/dp1) < 0. Thus, at θ = 1, ∂W
PP
∂θ =
dWPP
dθ < 0. Given
dWPP
dθ > 0 at θ = 0
and dW
PP
dθ < 0 at θ = 1, and, given the second order condition
d2WPP
dθ2 < 0, it follows that the optimal stage 1 choice of
θ is some θ∗ that lies in the open interval (0, 1). Hence, at θ = θ∗ the equilibrium price vector (pPP1 (θ
∗), pPP2 (θ∗)) must
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belong to the interior of the segment AB (say some point like D in Figure 2) where the iso-welfare curve is tangent to
the R2R′2 curve.
Step (ii): On the (p1, p2) plane, for any given θ ∈ [0, 1], all points in SVPP1 (θ) must lie to the left all points in
P(SVQQ1 (θ)).
Proof of Step (ii): In Stage 2, if Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then Firm 1’s reaction function is given by
(26) VPP1,1 (p, θ) = (p1 − c)FPP1,1 (p) + θFPP1 (p) + (1− θ)FPP2,1 (p) = 0.
In Stage 2, if Firm 2 chooses quantity strategy, then Firm 1’s reaction function is
(27) VQQ1,1 (q, θ) = F
QQ
1 (q)− c+ θq1FQQ1,1 (q) = 0.
If ( pˆ1, pˆ2) is a solution to (27), then pˆ1 − c + θFPP1 ( pˆ1, pˆ2)FQQ1,1 (FPP1 ( pˆ1, pˆ2), FPP2 ( pˆ1, pˆ2)) = 0 implying that pˆ1 −
c = −θFPP1 ( pˆ1, pˆ2)FQQ1,1 (FPP1 ( pˆ1, pˆ2), FPP2 ( pˆ1, pˆ2)). At ( pˆ1, pˆ2), VPP1,1 ( pˆ1, pˆ2, θ) = ( pˆ1 − c)FPP1,1 + θFPP1 + (1− θ)FPP2,1 =
θ
(
1− FPP1,1 FQQ1,1
)
FPP1 + (1− θ)FPP2,1 < 0. Therefore, given any θ ∈ [0, 1], we have SVPP1 ( pˆ2, θ) < pˆ1, that is, all points
satisfying p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) must lie to the left of all points in P(SVQQ1 (θ)).
Step (iii): In Stage 2, choosing price is the dominant strategy for Firm 2.
Proof of Step (iii): When Firm 1 chooses price strategy, the curve R2R′2 is the reaction function of Firm 2. Therefore,
the singleton set SVPP1 ∩RPP2 must lie to the left of all points in the set P(SVQQ1 (θ)) ∩RPP2 . Therefore, at any given
θ, if Firm 1 chooses price strategy, then it is always optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy. When Firm 1 chooses
quantity strategy, the set of points P(RQQ2 ) represent the reaction function of Firm 2 in terms of prices. Again, like
Lemma 7, one can show that if we generate the Cournot equilibrium path in the price space by changing θ from 0
to 1 and plotting the corresponding price vector, then, along that Cournot equilibrium path, as we move from price
vector (pQQ1 (0), p
QQ
2 (0)) to price vector (p
QQ
1 (1), p
QQ
2 (1)) the underlying θ increases. Like Lemma 2(ii), one can also
show that ∂p
QQ
1
∂θ > 0. Hence, along that Cournot equilibrium path, p1 also increases. By Assumption 5,
∂piQQ2
∂q1
> 0
and FPP1,1 < 0 implying dpi
QQ
2 (F
PP
1 (p), R
QQ
2 (F
PP
1 (p)))/dp1 =
∂piQQ2
∂q1
FPP1,1 < 0 . Therefore, along the Cournot equilibrium
path, the profit of the Firm 2 decreases as we move from (pQQ1 (0), p
QQ
2 (0)) to (p
QQ
1 (1), p
QQ
2 (1)). Since, by Step (ii) for
any θ the set of point SVPP1 (θ) lie to the left of the set of points in P(SVQQ1 (θ)), the profit associated with the point in
the singleton set P(SVQQ1 (θ)) ∩ P(RQQ2 ) is less than profits from all point in the set SVPP1 (θ) ∩ P(RQQ2 ). Therefore,
at any given θ, if Firm 1 chooses quantity strategy, then also it is optimal for Firm 2 to choose price strategy.
Step (iv): In Stage 2, if Firm 2 chooses price strategy, then Firm 1 also chooses price strategy.
Proof of Step (iv): On the region lying above the set T := {p | p2 ≥ c, p1 + p2 ≥ 2c}, VPP1,2 (p, θ) = θpiPP1,2 (p) + (1−
θ)WPP2 (p) < 0. Therefore, V
PP
1 (p, θ) is decreasing in p2 for all points in the set SVPP1 (θ) ∩ T . Again, the reaction
function of Firm 2 given Firm 1 chooses price (that is, the R2R′2 curve in Figure 2) lies above the line p2 = c and each
point in this reaction function lies below all points in the set P(RQQ2 ). Moreover, all points on the AB segment in
Figure 2 is contained in T and for all points on the AB segment we have dVPP1 (SVPP1 (p2, θ), p2)/dp2 < 0. Therefore,
at the intersection point of the R2R′2 curve and the p1 = SVPP1 (p2, θ) curve, we value of V
PP
1 (p, θ) is higher compared
to all points in the set SVPP1 ∩P(RQQ2 ). Hence, given Firm 2 chooses price strategy, it is always optimal for Firm 1 to
choose price strategy. Hence, Step (iv) follows.
Step (iii) and Step (iv) shows that given any θ ∈ [0, 1], price competition is the only Nash equilibrium of the
sub-game starting from Stage 2. By Step (i), at some θ∗(∈ (0, 1)), the government maximizes welfare under price
competition. Therefore, the strategy combination (θPP = θ∗, (P, pPP1 (θ
PP)), (P, pPP2 (θ
PP))) is the unique SPNE of Γ.
30 MANIPUSHPAK MITRA, RUPAYAN PAL, ARINDAM PAUL, AND P. M. SHARADA
REFERENCES
[1] Anderson, S. P., de Palma, A., Thisse, J.-F., 1997. Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry. Euro-
pean Economic Review 41, 1635-1654.
[2] Apostol, T. M., 1969. Calculus, Volume II (Second edition). Wiley, New York.
[3] Backx, M., Carney, M., Gedajlovic, E., 2002. Public, private and mixed ownership and the performance of
international Airlines. Journal of Air Transport Management 8, 213-220.
[4] Badertscher , B., Shroff, N., Hal, D., White, H. D., 2013. Externalities of public firm presence: Evidence from
private firms’ investment decisions. Journal of Financial Economics, 109, 682-706.
[5] Cheng, L., 1985. Comparing Bertrand and Cournot equilibria: a geometric approach. RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 16, 146-152.
[6] Cheng, L., 1985. Inverting system of demand functions. Journal of Economic Theory 37, 202-210.
[7] deFraja G., Delbono, F., 1989. Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly. Oxford Economic Papers
41, 302311.
[8] Dixit, A., 1979. A model of duopoly suggesting a theory of entry barriers. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 20-32.
[9] Dixit, A., 1986. Comparative statics for oligopoly. International Economic Review, 107-122.
[10] Dixit, A., Stiglitz, J., 1977. Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity. American Economic Re-
view 67, 297-308.
[11] Doganis, R., 2001. The Airline Business in the 21st Century, Routledge, London.
[12] Eyles, A., Machin, S., McNally, S., 2017. Unexpected school reform: academisation of primary schools in Eng-
land. Journal of Public Economics, doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.004.
[13] Fershtman, C., Judd, K., 1984. Equilibrium incentives in oligopoly. American Economic Review 77, 927-940.
[14] Fujiwara, K., 2007. Partial privatization in a differentiated mixed oligopoly. Journal of Economics 92, 51-65.
[15] Ghosh, A., Mitra, M., 2010. Comparing Bertrand and Cournot in mixed markets. Economics Letters 109, 72-74.
[16] Ghosh, A., Mitra, M., 2014. Reversal of BertrandCournot rankings in the presence of welfare concerns. Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 170, 496-519.
[17] Greenfield, K. 2008. The Impact of “Going Private” on Corporate Stakeholders. Brooklyn Journal of Corporate,
Financial and Commercial Law 3, 75-88.
[18] Ha¨ckner, J., 2000. A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies. Journal of Economic
Theory 93, 233-239.
[19] Haraguchi, J., Matsumura, T. 2016. CournotBertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly. Journal of Economics,
117(2), 117-136.
[20] Heifetz, A., Shannon, C., Spiegel, Y., 2007. What to maximize if you must. Journal of Economic Theory 133,
31-57.
[21] La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2002. Government ownership of banks. Journal of Finance 57,
265-301.
[22] Kreps, D., Scheinkman, J.-A, 1983. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot out-
comes. Bell Journal of Economics 14, 326-337.
[23] Matsumura, T., 1998. Partial privatization in mixed duopoly. Journal of Public Economics 70, 473-483.
[24] Matsumura, T. and Ogawa, A., 2012. Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly. Economics Letters, 116, 174-177.
[25] Miller, N. and Pazgal, A., 2001. The equivalence of price and quantity competition with delegation. RAND
Journal of Economics 32, 284-301.
[26] Ohnishi, K., 2010. Partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopoly. Economics Bulletin 30, 309-314.
CO-EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIRMS, AND PRICE COMPETITION 31
[27] Ohnishi, K., 2011. Partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopolies with complementary goods. Modern
Economy 2, 45-48.
[28] Okuguchi, K., 1987. Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies. Journal of Economic Theory
42, 128-139.
[29] Sanjo, Y., 2009. Bertrand competition in a mixed duopoly market. Manchester School 77, 373-397.
[30] Singh, N. and Vives, X., 1984. Price and quantity competition in a differentiated duopoly. RAND Journal of
Economics 15, 546-554.
[31] Sklivas, S. D., 1987. The strategic choice of managerial incentives. RAND Journal of Economics 18, 452-458.
[32] Vickers, J., 1985. Delegation and the theory of the firm. Economic Journal, Supplement 95, 138-147.
[33] Vives, X., 1985. On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation. Journal of
Economic Theory 36, 166-175.
[34] Vives, X., 1999. Oligopoly pricing–old ideas and new tools. MIT Press, Cambridge and London.
[35] Zanchettin, P., 2006. Differentiated duopoly with asymmetric costs. Journal of Economics and Management
Strategy 15, 999-1015.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT, INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, KOLKATA, INDIA.
E-mail address: mmitra@isical.ac.in
INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH, MUMBAI, INDIA.
E-mail address: rupayan@igidr.ac.in
ECONOMIC RESEARCH UNIT, INDIAN STATISTICAL INSTITUTE, KOLKATA, INDIA.
E-mail address: arish309@gmail.com
INDIRA GANDHI INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH, MUMBAI, INDIA.
E-mail address: sharadapm1990@gmail.com
